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Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) 
 
Daniel M. Brister 
 
In 2015, a group of adolescents between the ages of eight and 
nineteen filed a lawsuit against the federal government for infringing upon 
their civil rights to a healthy, habitable future living environment. Those 
Plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States alleged that the industrial-scale 
burning of fossil fuels was causing catastrophic and destabilizing impacts 
to the global climate, threatening the survival and welfare of present and 
future generations. Seeking to reduce the United States’ contributions to 
atmospheric carbon dioxide, Plaintiffs demanded injunctive and 
declaratory relief to halt the federal government’s policies of promoting 
and subsidizing fossil fuels, due to the limited timeframe for addressing 
the impacts of climate change. While extensive motion practice has 
impeded a hearing on merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, Juliana v. United States 
addressed threshold questions concerning constitutional and procedural 
claims. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Juliana v. United States, the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon upheld in part and denied in part the federal 
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for 
summary judgment and denied their request to certify the case for 
interlocutory appeal.1 Defendants argued that the court should dismiss 
President Trump as a defendant2 and that the case should be dismissed as 
a result of Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”)3 and issues relating to separation of powers,4 
standing,5 due process,6 and the public trust doctrine.7 The District Court 
rejected most of Defendants’ substantive claims and ultimately held that 
Plaintiffs should be permitted to argue that they have a fundamental right 
to a climate system capable of sustaining human life.8  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A group of 21 young people, the nonprofit organization Earth 
Guardians, and climatologist Dr. James Hansen (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 
filed a lawsuit in August 2015 against the federal government, naming the 
                                                 
1.  Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1105 (D. Or. 2018). 
2. Id. at 1076.  
3. Id. at 1080. 
4.  Id. at 1084. 
5.  Id. at 1086. 
6.  Id. at 1097. 
7.  Id. at 1101. 
8. Id. at 1103.  
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United States, the President,9 and the heads of multiple executive agencies 
(collectively, “Defendants”).10  Plaintiffs asserted the government “ha[s] 
known for more than fifty years" that the industrial-scale release of carbon 
dioxide (“CO2”) is causing dangerous changes to the global climate and 
threatening the lives, liberty, and property of present and future 
generations.11 Plaintiffs alleged that—instead of responding to this 
knowledge by adopting policies to rationally phase out carbon pollution—
Defendants, through the permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing of fossil 
fuels, have deliberately allowed atmospheric CO2 levels to reach 
dangerous and unprecedented levels.12 Numerous courts have held 
multiple procedural hearings and delivered various orders arising from 
Defendants’ extensive motion practice in this case.13 The latest example 
of this motion practice was addressed by the District Court, which 
expressed exasperation with Defendants’ rehashing of arguments 
previously raised and decided in prior stages of litigation.14  
In January 2017, Defendants answered Plaintiffs’ first amended 
complaint, leaving uncontested many of the complaint’s scientific and 
factual allegations.15 For example, Defendants did not refute Plaintiffs’ 
assertion that some federal employees had been aware—for at least 50 
years—of the growing body of scientific research and consensus around 
the role of CO2 in causing “measurable long-lasting changes to the global 
climate, resulting in an array of severe and deleterious effects to human 
beings, which will worsen over time.”16 Additionally, Defendants agreed 
that anthropogenic climate change has been occurring since the mid-1900s 
and that it is damaging human and natural systems and increasing the risk 
of extinction for many species.17 According to the court, these admissions 
showed that Defendants were aware of the existence of climate change, 
that such changes were human-induced through the burning of fossil fuels,
                                                 
9.  President Trump replaced President Obama as Defendant when he 
assumed the presidency in January 2017. 
10. Juliana, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 1071.  
11.  Id.  
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. at 1071–1075. 
14.  Id. at 1068 (“Federal defendants raise several arguments in their 
motion for summary judgment, many of which were previously considered in the 
November 2016 Order.”); Id. (“Federal defendants further argue, as they did in their 
previous motion to dismiss, that there is no fundamental right to a climate change 
system capable of sustaining human life . . .”); Id. (“Federal defendants argue, as they 
did at the pleadings stage, that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring their 
claims.”); Id. at 1089 (“Federal defendants have presented no new controlling 
authority or other evidence which changes the Court’s previous analysis.”); Id. at 1090 
(“Federal defendants offer nothing to contradict these submissions, and merely recycle 
arguments from their previous motion.”); Id. at 1096 (“Federal defendants offer no 
new evidence or controlling authority on this issue that warrant reconsideration of the 
Court’s previous analysis.”). 
15.  Id. at 1072. 
16. Id. 
17.  Id. 
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and that climate change poses a “monumental” danger to future 
Americans.18 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The District Court’s October 15, 2018 opinion and order 
addressed two interrelated motions filed by Defendants—a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and a motion for summary judgment.19 Under 
both types of motions, the court must decide whether the facts presented 
in the complaint would entitle Plaintiffs to a legal remedy.20 Plaintiffs’ 
claims survived mostly intact.21 
 
A. Judgment on the Pleadings 
 
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings raised two 
issues presented for the first time and two issues upon which the court had 
previously ruled.22 First, Defendants moved to dismiss with prejudice 
President Trump as a named defendant.23 Next, they moved to have the 
entire suit dismissed on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 
the APA.24 Third, Defendants sought dismissal on separation of powers 
grounds.25 Finally, Defendants asked the court to reconsider the November 
2016 denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion.26 
 
i. Motion to Dismiss President Trump as Defendant 
 
The district court first turned to the issue of whether to dismiss 
President Trump as a defendant in the suit.27 Plaintiffs were willing to 
stipulate dismissal of President Trump as a defendant, so long as his 
dismissal was without prejudice.28 However, Defendants asserted that 
anything less than dismissal with prejudice would violate separation of 
powers principles.29 The court cited the longstanding canon of 
constitutional avoidance as the basis for dismissing the President, and 
provided that “because granting equitable relief against the President of 
the United States raises serious constitutional questions, dismissal of the 
President as a defendant is appropriate whenever it appears likely that the 
plaintiffs’ injuries can be redressed through relief against another 
                                                 
18. Id. 
19.  Id. at 1075–1076. 
20.  Id. at 1075. 
21.  Id. at 1071.  
22.  Id. at 1076. 
23.  Id.  
24.  Id. at 1080. 
25.  Id. at 1084. 
26.  Id.  
27. Id. at 1076. 
28. Id.  
29. Id.  
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defendant.”30 However, the court declined to categorize the President’s 
dismissal as one with prejudice, because “[t]he Court [could] not conclude 
with certainty that President Trump [would] never become essential to 
affording complete relief” to Plaintiffs.31 In so deciding, the court 
disagreed with Defendants’ contentions that inferior “federal courts lack 
jurisdiction to issue equitable relief in connection with a sitting president’s 
performance of his official duties.” 32 
 
ii. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under the APA 
 
Defendants’ next argument focused on Plaintiffs’ challenges to 
the actions and inactions of federal agencies by arguing that the only 
proper avenue for relief was by way of the APA.33 In rejecting this motion, 
the court held that Plaintiffs had not—and need not have—brought their 
claims under the APA because Plaintiffs’ claims involved constitutional 
arguments, which have no “final agency action” requirement.34 Owing to 
the complex set of factors influencing climate change, the court held it 
would be impossible for Plaintiffs to argue that their injuries resulted from 
a single agency action.35 The unique nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, which 
require review of “aggregate action by multiple agencies,” placed them 
outside of the APA’s scope.36 
 
iii. Motion to Dismiss on Separation of Powers Grounds 
 
The court next addressed Defendants’ motion to dismiss on 
separation of powers grounds, and the request to reconsider the court’s 
2016 denial to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted.37 The court began by “recogniz[ing] that there are limits to the 
power of the judicial branch,” and then separately addressed issues related 
to separation of powers and challenges to subject matter jurisdiction.38 
Relying on the law of the case doctrine as precluding Defendants’ 
arguments on separation of powers issues, the court made clear that it was 
“under no obligation to give full consideration to a rehash of arguments 
already presented in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”39  Because Defendants had 
previously raised a 12(b)(6) motion, and “[n]othing ha[d] changed to 
warrant expending judicial resources in retreading that ground,” the 
district court “decline[d] to revisit its earlier rulings” on the separation of 
                                                 
30. Id. at 1078.  
31. Id. at 1080.  
32.  Id.   
33.  Id.  
34.  Id. at 1081. 
35.  Id. at 1084. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38. Id.  
39. Id. at 1085.  
2019                             JULIANA V. UNITED STATES                            5 
 
powers issues.40  
As to the subject matter jurisdiction issues, while “the law of the 
case doctrine [did] not apply,” the court nevertheless declined to revisit its 
prior rulings.41 In addressing these arguments, the court again reiterated to 
Defendants its awareness of separation of powers principles at play but 
held fast to the notion “that it is ‘emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.’”42 The court declined to shirk 
its responsibility to “fulfill [its] role as a check on any unconstitutional 
actions of the other branches of government.”43 The court did not consider 
the merits of Defendants’ motions anew, but rather relied on the fact that 
those motions had been previously raised and rejected.44 Citing the fact 
Defendants raised the same arguments in previous hearings, the court held 
that “courts are under no obligation to give full consideration to a rehash 
of arguments already presented.”45 With respect to the separation of 
powers issues, the court reminded Defendants that it had addressed the 
question extensively; the claims “did not require dismissal” in 2016, and 
did not require dismissal now. 
 
B. Summary Judgment 
 
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendants raised a host of  
legal arguments: (1) Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue because 
they could not prove injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability;46 (2) 
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the APA;47 (3) Separation of powers 
principles barred Plaintiffs’ claims;48 (4) Plaintiffs’ due process claims to 
a “fundamental right to an environment capable of sustaining human 
life”49 and the “state-created danger theory” were insufficient;50 and (5) 
the public trust doctrine applies only to states and not the federal 
government.51   
 
i. Standing  
 
 The court addressed the three elements of Article III standing—
injury in fact, causation, and redressability—in turn.52 On the question of 
injury in fact, the court referred to Plaintiffs’ sworn declarations, attesting 
                                                 
40.  Id. at 1085. 
41.  Id.  
42. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).  
43. Id. at 1085-1086.  
44.  Id. at 1084–1085 
45.  Id. at 1085. 
46. Id. at 1086. 
47.  Id. at 1096. 
48.  Id. at 1097.  
49.  Id. at 1097–1098. 
50.  Id. at 1098–1099. 
51.  Id. at 1101–1102. 
52.  Id. at 1087–1094. 
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to a range of personal injuries resulting from climate change.53 Plaintiffs’ 
expert witnesses drew connections between these injuries and fossil fuel-
caused warming.54 Noting that Defendants did not attempt to refute these  
assertions, the court held that “Plaintiffs and their experts ha[d] provided 
‘specific facts,’ of immediate and concrete injuries.”55 
As to causation, the court commented on the fact that Defendants 
admitted the U.S. was responsible for more than 25 percent of cumulative 
global CO2 emissions between 1850 and 2012,56 that such emissions could 
be tied to climate change, and that climate change could be shown to be 
causally related to the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs.57 Because surviving 
summary judgment requires only a showing that genuine issues of material 
fact remain, the court found “Plaintiffs ha[d] provided sufficient evidence 
showing that causation for their claims [was] more than attenuated.”58 
Citing the lower standard of review required to survive a motion 
for summary judgment, the court rejected Defendants’ contention that 
redress was impossible because Plaintiffs’ requested remedies were 
beyond the court’s authority.59 Plaintiffs’ burden was not to “show that a 
favorable decision is certain to redress [their] injury;” rather,  Plaintiffs 
need only show a “substantial likelihood” that the court could provide 
meaningful relief.60 
 
ii. Failure to State a Claim Under the APA and Separation of Powers 
 
Similar to its analysis under Defendants’ motion on the pleadings, 
the court declined to entertain Defendants’ rehashing of old arguments 
already rejected by the court.61 On the separation of powers question, the 
court held that while the allocation of powers between the branches of the 
federal government is an important consideration, the issue was not 
sufficient to result in dismissal.62   
 
iii. Due Process Claims 
 
Defendants argued that the case should be dismissed because 
Americans do not have a fundamental constitutional right to a life-
                                                 
53.  Id. at 1087 (indicating that one Plaintiff’s home was flooded multiple 
times as a result of extreme weather events, another suffered injuries caused by sea 
level rise and extreme weather, and yet another suffered trauma and health effects as 
a result of increased frequency and intensity of wildfires). 
54.  Id. (including statistics showing that, in the 123 years such records 
have been kept, the five hottest years on record all occurred within the past decade). 
55.  Id. at 1090 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
561 (1992)). 
56.  Id. at 1091. 
57.  Id. at 1093. 
58.  Id.  
59.  Id. at 1093. 
60.  Id. at 1093, 1096. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. at 1097. 
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sustaining climate system.63 In rejecting this argument, the court held that 
the Constitution does, in fact, afford sufficient “protection against the 
government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens breathe or the 
water its citizens drink.”64 Defendants challenged Plaintiffs’ state-created 
danger theory, asserting Plaintiffs failed to show that government conduct 
was the proximate cause of “a dangerous situation in deliberate 
indifference to Plaintiffs’ safety.”65 Deliberate indifference, the court 
noted, “is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal 
actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”66 Noting 
that Defendants did not refute Plaintiffs’ evidence that Defendants were 
aware of—and failed to act upon—information showing that continued 
use of fossil fuels would harm the U.S. and its citizens, the court found the 
existence of a genuine issue of disputed fact sufficient for Plaintiffs to 
survive summary judgment.67 
Finally, the court turned to Defendants’ assertions that the public 
trust doctrine does not apply to the federal government.68 Noting once 
again that Defendants raised the same issues in an earlier proceeding, the 
court reiterated its previous order stating that “the public trust doctrine is 
deeply rooted in our nation’s history and that [P]laintiffs’ claims are 
viable.”69 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The claims argued here invoke complex and novel questions about 
the role of the judicial system in addressing climate change, injury in 
relation to standing, and constitutional rights. Regardless of how courts 
ultimately decide the merits of Juliana, the present case illustrates the 
ways litigation is developing to address what is arguably the most pressing 
issue of our time. Questions raised and answered through the process of 
this litigation will likely inform the scope and substance of future efforts 
to address climate change, both within and outside the legal system.  
                                                 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. at 1098 (quoting Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 
1250 (D. Or. 2016)). 
65.  Id.  
66.  Id. at 1099 (quoting Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th 
Cir. 2011)). 
67.  Id. at 1101. 
68. Id. at 1101.   
69.  Id. at 1101–1102. 
